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Abstract
In this paper we study a special class of multiobjective discrete control problems on dynamic networks. We assume that the
dynamics of the system is controlled by p actors (players) and each of them intend to minimize his own integral-time cost by a
certain trajectory. Applying Nash and Pareto optimality principles we study multiobjective control problems on dynamic networks
where the dynamics is described by a directed graph.
Polynomial-time algorithms for determining the optimal strategies of the players in the consideredmultiobjective control problems
are proposed exploiting the special structure of the underlying graph. Properties of time-expanded networks are characterized. A
constructive scheme which consists of several algorithms is presented.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Multiobjective discrete control; Polynomial-time algorithm; Network; c-games
1. Introduction and statement of the problem
We study multiobjective control problems of time-discrete systems with a ﬁnite set of states [1,7,5,8]. The main
results are based on a game theoretical approach to the following control problem [1,7]:
Let L be a time-discrete systemwith a ﬁnite set of states X.At every time step t=0, 1, 2, . . . the state of L is x(t) ∈ X.
Two states x0 and xf are given in X where x0 = x(0) represents the starting point of L and xf is the state in which the
system must be brought, i.e. xf is the ﬁnal state of L.
Remark 1 (Reachability). If we assume that the system L should reach the ﬁnal state xf at the time moment T (xf)
such that
T1T (xf)T2,
where T1 and T2 are given, we say that the ﬁnal state is reachable.
The dynamics of system L is described by a directed graph G= (X,E), where the vertices x ∈ X correspond to the
states of L and an arbitrary edge e= (x, y) ∈ E identiﬁes the possibility of the system’s passage from the state x =x(t)
E-mail addresses: lozovanu@math.md (D. Lozovanu), stefan.pickl@unibw.de (S. Pickl).
0166-218X/$ - see front matter © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.dam.2007.03.012
D. Lozovanu, S. Pickl / Discrete Applied Mathematics 155 (2007) 1846–1857 1847
to the state y = x(t + 1) at every moment of time t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . So, the set of edges E(x)= {e = (x, y)|(x, y) ∈ E}
originated in x corresponds to an admissible set of control parameterswhichdetermine the next possible statesy=x(t+1)
of L, if the state x=x(t) at the moment of time t is given. Therefore we considerE(x) = ∅,∀x ∈ X\{xf} andE(xf)=∅.
In addition, we assume that to each edge e = (x, y) ∈ E a cost function ce(t) is associated which depends on time and
which expresses the cost of system L to pass from the state x = x(t) to the state y = x(t + 1) at the stage [t, t + 1]
(a transition). So, the graph of these state transitions contains edges which represents the time dependent cost functions.
Furthermore, two vertices correspond to the starting and the ﬁnal states of the system.
Remark 2 (Dynamic network). Such a graph is called a dynamic network [6,10].
For a given dynamic network, consider the problem of ﬁnding a sequence of system’s transitions (x(0), x(1)),
(x(1), x(2)), . . . , (x(T (xf)−1), x(T (xf))) which transfer the system from the starting state x0 =x(0) to the ﬁnal state
xf = x(t (xf)), such that the integral-time cost Fx0xf should be minimized within the system dynamics:
Min Fx0xf =
T (xf )−1∑
t=0
c(x(t),x(t+1))(t)
s.t. T1T (xf)T2
with
x0 = x(0), x(1), x(2), . . . , x(T (xf)) = xf .
The minimization problem generalizes the well-known shortest path problem in a weighted directed graph [3] and
arose as an auxiliary problem while solving the minimum-cost ﬂow problem on dynamic networks [10]. Algorithms
based on dynamic programming methods for ﬁnding the optimal trajectory in dynamic networks have been elaborated
in [6]. In this paper we extend the dynamic programming technique to the multiobjective version of the problem
mentioned above. We assume that the dynamics of the system are controlled by p actors (players) and each of them
intend to minimize his own integral-time cost which is described by a certain trajectory.
2. Multiobjective control of noncooperative games
In this section we apply the concept of noncooperative games to our problem and formulate the following two
multiobjective control models concerning stationary and nonstationary strategies.
Remark 3 (Optimal stationary strategies in dynamic c-games). Let G = (X,E) be the graph introduced in Section
1 with given starting and ﬁnal states x0, xf ∈ X. Assume that the vertex set X is divided into p disjoint subsets
X1, X2, . . . , Xp (X =⋃pi=1Xi , Xi ∩ Xj = ∅, i = j ) and consider the vertices x ∈ Xi as states of player i, i = 1, p.
Moreover we assume that to each edge e = (x, y) of the graph p functions c1e (t), c2e (t), . . . , cpe (t) are assigned, where
cie(t) expresses the cost of system’s passage from the state x = x(t) to the state y = x(t + 1) at the stage [t, t + 1] for
player i. We deﬁne the stationary strategies of players 1, 2, . . . , p as maps:
si : x → y ∈ X(x) for x ∈ Xi\{xf}, i = 1, p,
where X(x) is a set of edges e = (x, y) starting in x, i.e.
X(x) = {y ∈ X|e = (x, y) ∈ E}.
Let s1, s2, . . . , sp be an arbitrary set of the strategies of the players.We denote byGs = (X,Es) the subgraph generated
by the edges e = (x, si(x)) for x ∈ Xi\{xf} and i = 1, p. Obviously, for ﬁxed s1, s2, . . . , sp either a unique directed
path Ps(x0, xf) from x0 to xf exists in Gs or such a path does not exist in Gs . The set of edges of path Ps(x0, xf) is
denoted by E(Ps(x0, xf)).
1848 D. Lozovanu, S. Pickl / Discrete Applied Mathematics 155 (2007) 1846–1857
For ﬁxed strategies s1, s2, . . . , sp and ﬁxed states x0 and xf we deﬁne within the dynamic c-game the quantities
H 1x0xf (s1, s2, . . . , sp),H
2
x0xf (s1, s2, . . . , sp), 0 . . . , H
p
x0xf (s1, s2, . . . , sp)
in the following way.
Let us assume that the path Ps(x0, xf) exists in Gs . Then it is unique and we can assign to its edges numbers
0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , ks , starting with the edge that begins in x0. These numbers characterize the time steps te(s1, s2, . . . , sp)
when the system passes from one state to another, if the strategies s1, s2, . . . , sp are chosen. Therefore, we put
Hix0xf (s1, s2, . . . , sp) =
∑
e∈E(Ps(x0,xf ))
cie(te(s1, s2, . . . , sp)) if T1 |E(Ps(x0, xf))|T2; (1)
(i.e. xf is reachable from x0, otherwise we put Hix0xf (s1, s2, . . . , sp) = ∞).
Remark 4 (Deﬁnition of a Nash equilibrium). We regard the problem of ﬁnding maps s∗1 , s∗2 , . . . , s∗p for which the
following conditions are satisﬁed:
Hix0xf (s
∗
1 , s
∗
2 , . . . , s
∗
i−1, s∗i , s∗i+1, . . . , s∗p)H ∗x0xf (s
∗
1 , s
∗
2 , . . . , s
∗
i−1, si , s∗i+1, . . . , s∗p) ∀si, i = 1, p.
So, we consider the problem of ﬁnding the equilibrium solutions in the sense of Nash [11].
This problem can be considered as dynamic game on network (G,X1, X2, . . . , Xp, c1(t), c2(t), . . . , cp(t), x0, xf ,
T1, T2) determined by the graph G, the partition X1, X2, . . . , Xp, vector-functions ci(t)= (cie1(t), cie2(t), . . . , cie|E|(t)),
i=1, p, the starting and ﬁnal states x0, xf and the time-interval [T1, T2]. If T1=0, T2=∞ then we shall use the notation
(G,X1, X2, . . . , Xp, c1(t), c2(t), . . . , cp(t), x0, xf). The last version of the problem has been studied in [6,2].
Here we regard the problem with an additional restriction (1). This is a new approach.
2.1. Optimal nonstationary strategies in dynamic c-games
In order to solve this special case, we deﬁne the nonstationary strategies of the players as maps:
u1 : (x, t) → (y, t + 1) ∈ X(x) × {t + 1} for X1\{xf}, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ;
u2 : (x, t) → (y, t + 1) ∈ X(x) × {t + 1} for X2\{xf}, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ;
...
up : (x, t) → (y, t + 1) ∈ X(x) × {t + 1} for Xp\{xf}, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
Here (x, t) has the same meaning as the notation x(t), i.e. (x, t) = x(t).
For any set of the nonstationary strategies u1, u2, . . . , up we deﬁne the quantities
F 1x0xf (u1, u2, . . . , up), F
2
x0xf (u1, u2, . . . , up), . . . , F
p
x0xf (u1, u2, . . . , up)
by the following way.
Let u1, u2, . . . , up be an arbitrary set of strategies. Then either u1, u2, . . . , up generate in G a ﬁnite trajectory
x0 = x(0), x(1), x(2), . . . , x(T (xf)) = xf
from x0 to xf and T (xf) represents the time moment when xf is reached, or u1, u2, . . . , up generate in G an inﬁnite
trajectory (the general problem of reachability is treated in detail in [5])
x0 = x(0), x(1), x(2), . . . , x(t), x(t + 1), . . .
which does not pass through xf , i.e. T (xf) = ∞. In such trajectories the next state x(t + 1) is determined uniquely by
x(t) and a map uk , k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p} as follows:
x(t + 1) = uk(x(t), t), x(t) ∈ Xk .
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If the state xf is reached at a ﬁnite moment of time T (xf) with T1T (xf)T2, then we deﬁne
F ix0xf (u1, u2, . . . , up) =
T (xf )−1∑
t=0
c(x(t),x(t+1))(t), i = 1, p;
otherwise we put
F ix0xf (u1, u2, . . . , up) = ∞, i = 1, p.
Thus we regard the problem of ﬁnding the nonstationary strategies u∗1, u∗2, . . . , u∗p for which the following condition
is satisﬁed:
F ix0xf (u
∗
1, u
∗
2, . . . , u
∗
i−1, u∗i , u∗i+1, . . . , u∗p)F ∗x0xf (u
∗
1, u
∗
2, . . . , u
∗
i−1, ui, u∗i+1, . . . , u∗p) ∀ui, i = 1, p.
So, we consider the problem of ﬁnding the equilibrium in the sense of Nash [9].
3. Multiobjective control of cooperative games
Now we shall use the concept of cooperative games and formulate multiobjective control problems applying the
Pareto optimality principle. In an analogous way as in the previous section we distinguish two versions of the problem
concerning stationary and nonstationary strategies.
3.1. Stationary strategies on networks
On G we consider now the following cooperative game:
The stationary strategies of the players 1, 2, . . . , p are deﬁned as a map
s : x → y ∈ X(x) for x ∈ X\{xf}.
For an arbitrary stationary strategy s ∈ S = {s| : x → y ∈ X(x) for x ∈ X\{xf}} we denote by Gs = (X,Es) the
subgraph of G generated by the edges of the form e = (x, s(x)) for x ∈ X\{xf}. Then for every s ∈ S in G either a
unique directed path Ps(x0, xf) from x0 to xf exists or such a path does not exists in G.
For a given s and ﬁxed x0 and xf we deﬁne the quantities H
1
x0xf (s),H
2
x0xf (s), . . . , H
p
x0xf (s) by the following way:
Let us assume that the path Ps(x0, xf) exists in G. Then it is unique and we can assign to its edges numbers
0, 1, 2, . . . , ks , starting with the edge that begins in x0. These numbers determine the time steps te(s) when the system
passes from one state to another if the stationary strategy s is applied. We put
H
i
x0xf (s) =
∑
e∈E(Ps(x0,xf ))
cie(te(s)) if T1 |E(Ps(x0, xf))|T2;
otherwise we put Hix0xf (s) = ∞.
Remark 5 (Pareto solution). We consider the problem of ﬁnding the set S∗p of Pareto solutions (or a Pareto solution)
in the set of stationary strategies S. Note [5], where s∗ ∈ X is called a Pareto solution if in S\S∗p there is no strategy s′
such that
H
i
x0xf (s
′)Hix0xf (s
∗), i = 1, p,
and Hix0xf (s
′)<Hi0x0xf (s
∗) for an index i0 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p}.
3.2. Nonstationary strategies on networks
The nonstationary strategy for our cooperative dynamic game is deﬁned as a map
u : (x, t) → (y, t + 1) ∈ X(x) × {t + 1} for x ∈ X\{xf}, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
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The payoff functions
F
1
x0xf (u), F
2
x0xf (u), . . . , F
p
x0xf (u)
of the game are deﬁned in the following way:
Let u be an arbitrary strategy. Then u either generates in G a ﬁnite trajectory
x0 = x(0), x(1), x(2), . . . , x(T (xf)) = xf
from x0 to xf and T (xf) represents the time moment when xf is reached, or u generates in G a inﬁnite trajectory
x0 = x(0), x(1), x(2), . . . , x(t), x(t + 1), . . .
which does not pass through xf , i.e. T (xf)= ∞. In both cases the next states x(t + 1) are determined uniquely by x(t)
and u(t) as follows:
x(t + 1) = u(x(t), t), t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T2.
If the state xf is reached at a ﬁnite moment of time T (xf) (i.e. the reachability T1T (xf)T2 is guaranteed) then we
set
Fx0xf (u) =
T (x0)−1∑
t=0
ci(x(t),x(t+1))(t), i = 1, p;
otherwise we put
F ix0xf (u) = ∞, i = 1, p.
In the next part we present a solution principle which exploits the special structure of a time-expanded dynamic
network.
4. The time-expanded network
Time-expanded networks are utilized in [4]. In the followingwe exploit this special structure for our solution principle.
It is a great advantage that the cooperative and the noncooperative case can be solved by the same approach.
4.1. An existence result
Let (G,X1, X2, . . . , Xp, c1(t), c2(t), . . . , cp(t), x0, xf , T1, T2) be a networkwhich determines our dynamic c-game.
We assume that in G= (X,E) any vertex x ∈ X is reachable from x0. Additionally, we construct an auxiliary network
(G,Z1, Z2, . . . , Zp, c
1(t), c2(t), . . . , cp(t), y0, yf) where the graph G = (Y,E) is obtained as follows:
Y = Y 0 ∪ Y 1 ∪ Y 2 ∪ · · · ∪ YT1 ∪ YT1+1 ∪ · · · ∪ YT2 (Y t ∩ Y k = ∅, t = k),
where Y t = (X, t) corresponds to the set of states at the time step t, t = 0, T2;
E = E0 ∪ E1 ∪ E2 ∪ · · · ∪ ET1 ∪ ET1+1 ∪ · · · ∪ ET2−1 ∪ E;
where
Et = {((x, t), (y, t + 1))|(x, t) ∈ Y t , (y, t + 1) ∈ Y t+1, (x, y) ∈ E}, t = 0, T2 − 1;
E1 = {((x, t), (y, T2))|(x, t) ∈ Y t , (y, T2) ∈ YT2 , (x, y) ∈ E}, t = T1, T2 − 2.
In the case T1 =T2 we obtain a T2-layered network. So, the sets Y t = (X, t), t = 0, T2 represent T2 + 1 copies of the set
X where level sets (layers) Y t and Y t+1 are linked by edges of the form ((x, t), (y, t + 1)) if (x, y) ∈ E. Additionally,
in G there exist edges ((x, t), (y, T2)) which connect the set (X, t) and (X, T2), t = t1, T2 − 2.
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The cost functions on the edges ((x, t), (y, t + 1)), ((x, t), (y, T2)) in G can be interpreted as an initial network, i.e.
c((x,t),(y,t+1))(t) = c(x,y)(t), t = 0, T2 − 1;
c((x,t),(y,T2))(t) = c(x,y)(t), t = T1, T2 − 1.
The sets Zi of the players’ position in that auxiliary network are Zi =⋃t (Xi, t), i = 1, p .
Remark 6 (Main properties of time-expanded networks). The time-expanded network for the cooperative case of the
problem is deﬁned in the same way as for the noncooperative case. There is only one single exception: we do not take
into account the partition Y = Z1 ∪ Z2 ∪ · · · ∪ Zp, T1, T2.
Therefore for the cooperative case of the problem the initial network and the auxiliary time-expanded network are
represented by (G,X, c1(t), c2(t), . . . , cp(t), x0, xf , T1, T2) and (G, Y, c1(t), c2(t), . . . , cp(t), y0, yf), respectively.
Then we can prove the following properties:
Lemma 1. In the following x0, xf , y0 and yf are introduced according to the initial network and the auxiliary time-
expanded network:
Let P(y0, yf) be an arbitrary directed path from y0 to yf in the graph G. Then the number of edges |E(P (y0, yf))|
of the directed path P(y0, yf) satisﬁes the condition
T1 |E(P (y0, yf))|T2.
Moreover in G there exists a directed path P(y0, yf) from y0 to yf if and only if there exists in G a directed path
P(x0, xf) from x0 to xf . (P(x0, xf) may contain directed cycles), which contain the same number of edges
|E(P (x0, xf))| = |E(P (y0, yf))|.
Proof. Let P(y0, yf) be an arbitrary path from y0 to yf in G and let us show that
T1 |E(P (y0, yf))|T2,
where E(P (y0, yf)) is the set of edges in the path P(y0, yf). Indeed the path P(y0, yf) contains at least T1 edges
because it passes through all the layers Y 0, Y 1, Y 2, . . . , Y T1 . On the other hand the number of the edges of the path
P(y0, yf) could not exceed T2 because each vertex (x, t) of the level sets YT1 , Y T1+1, . . . , Y T2 are connected with
(xf , T2) in G (if in G there exists an edge (x, xf)). 
This argumentation leads to the following results:
Remark 7 (Existence result). In the following we distinguish between the case if a directed cycle occurs or not:
• LetG be a graphwith no directed cycles. ThenG is an acyclic graph and inG there exists a directed pathP(y0, yf)
from y0 to yf with the property
T1 |E(P (y0, yf))|T2
if and only if in G there exists a path P(x0, xf) from x0 to xf with the property
T1 |E(P (x0, xf))|T2.
• Let G be a graph which may contain directed cycles. If P(y0, yf) is an arbitrary path from y0 to yf in G with the
vertex set
V (P (y0, yf)) = {y0, y1, y2, . . . , yT (xf ) = yf},
where yt = (xt , t), t = 1, T (xf), then {x0, x1, x2, . . . , xT (xf ) = xf} generates in G a directed path P(x0, xf) from
x0 to xf (where P(x0, xf) may contain directed cycles).
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So one may conclude that the auxiliary time-expanded network gives all admissible directed paths from x0 to xf for
the considered problems (for the noncooperative and for the cooperative case).After this existence result, an algorithmic
solution is presented.
5. Algorithmic determination of Nash equilibria for dynamic c-games
In this section algorithms for determining the equilibrium in dynamic c-games are proposed.
5.1. The stationary case
The problem of determining theNash stationary strategies of the players in the dynamic c-games (without a restriction
on the number of stages) has been studied in [2,4]. Nash equilibria conditions for dynamic c-games with positive and
constant costs on the edges of the related network are formulated in [2]. Here we extend these results for dynamic
c-games with a given restriction (see (1)) on the number of stages.
Theorem 1. Let (G,X1, X2, . . . , Xp, c1, c2, . . . , cp, x0, xf , T1, T2) be a dynamic network with given positive and
constant cost functions cie, i = 1, p, on the edges e ∈ E, where G= (X,E) does not contain directed cycles. Moreover
let us assume that in G xf is reachable from x0.
Then for the dynamic c-game on network (G,X1, X2, . . . , Xp, c1, c2, . . . , cp, x0, xf) there exists an equilibrium
stationary strategy in the sense of Nash s∗1 , s∗2 , . . . , s∗p.
Proof. Let us consider the auxiliary time-expanded network (G, Y1, Y2, . . . , Yp, c1, c2, . . . , cp, y0, yf) from Section
4: according to the results of [2,4] for a dynamic c-game on this network there exists the Nash (stationary) strategies for
the players 1, 2, . . . , p. InG=(Y,E) they generate a trajectory y0=(x0, 0), (x1, 1), (x2, 2) . . . . . . , (xT (xf ), T (xf)=yf).
Moreover, according to Lemma 1, we have T1T (xf)T2. Since G is an acyclic graph the trajectory x0, x1, . . . , xT (xf )
does not contain directed cycles. The construction given below shows that x0, x1, . . . , xT (xf ) corresponds to a trajectory
in G generated by the stationary strategies s∗1 , s∗2 , . . . , s∗p of the players for the dynamic c-game on the network
(G,X1, X2, . . . , Xp, c1, c2, . . . , cp, x0, xf , T1, T2).
The stationary strategies s∗1 , s∗2 , . . . , s∗p can be obtained from s
∗
1, s
∗
2, . . . , s
∗
p by using the following algorithm:
Algorithm 1. Preliminary step (step 0). SetW 0={(x0, 0), (x1, 1), . . . , (xT (xf ), T (xf))} anX0={x0, x1, . . . , xT (xf )}.
For every xt ∈ X0, t = 0, T (xf) we put s∗i (xt ) = xt+1 if xt ∈ Xi , i = {1, 2, . . . , p}.
General step (step k). If Xk−1 = X then STOP; otherwise we characterize the set
Ws∗(X
k−1) = {(x, t) ∈ (X\Xk−1) × {1, 2, . . . , T2}|s∗i (x, t) ∈ Wk−1, for (x, t) ∈ Yi, i = 1, p}.
If Ws∗(Xk−1) = ∅ we ﬁnd a vertex (x′, t ′) ∈ Ws∗(Xk−1) with a minimal t ′ for a given x′. Then we put s∗i (x′) = z if
s∗i (x′, t ′) = (z, t + 1) and (x′, t ′) ∈ Yi .
Additionally, we generate the set Xk = Xk−1 ∪ {x′}. If Ws∗(Xk−1) = ∅ then for every x ∈ Xk−1 we put s∗i (x) = z if
s∗i (x, t) = (z, t + 1) [where t is minimal in G for a given x] STOP.
If the conditions of the theorem hold then s∗1 , s∗2 , . . . , s∗p represents the equilibrium solution in the sense of Nash for
the dynamic c-game on the network (G,X1, X2, . . . , Xp, c1, c2, . . . , cp, x0, xf , T1, T2). 
So, the problem of determining the equilibrium stationary strategies in a dynamic c-game on the acyclic network
(G,X1, X2, . . . , Xp, c1, c2, . . . , cp, x0, xf , T1, T2) with positive and constant cost function on the edges can be solved
in the following way:
Algorithm 2.
1. We construct the auxiliary time-expanded network (G, Y1, Y2, . . . , Yp, c1, c2, . . . . . . , cp, y0, yf).
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Fig. 1.
2. We ﬁnd the equilibrium stationary strategies s∗1 , s∗2 , . . . , s∗p of the players in a dynamic c-game on an auxiliary
time-expanded network.
3. We apply Algorithm 1 and determine the stationary strategies s∗1 , s∗2 , . . . , s∗p.
Remark 8. If c1(t), c2(t), . . . , cp(t) are not constant cost functions then Theorem 1 may fail to hold. An example
which conﬁrms this statement is the following:
We consider the dynamic network consisting of the discrete graph G = (X,E) (see Fig. 1) with a given partition of
the vertex set X = X1 ∪ X2, X1 = {1, 2}, X2 = {3, 4, 5}, where x0 = 1, xf = 5:
All cost functions on the edges are equal to 1 except of the following:
c1(1,3)(t) ≡ c2(1,3)(t) ≡ 3;
c2(2,5)(t) =
{
1 if t1,
M if t > 1;
c2(4,5)(t) =
{
1 if t2,
M if t > 2.
It is easy to check that the equilibrium stationary strategies in the sense of Nash for the dynamic c-game on this network
does not exist.
In the followingwe show that for the nonstationary case of the dynamic c-gameNash equilibria exist for the following
case:
In G there exists a path PG(x0, xf) from x0 to xf which satisfy the condition T1 |E(PG(x0, xf))|T2.
5.2. The nonstationary case
Now we show that the problem of ﬁnding Nash equilibria for nonstationary dynamic c-games can be reduced to the
stationary case of the game on an auxiliary time-expanded network with constant cost functions on the edges.
Theorem 2. Let (G,X1, X2, . . . , Xp, c1(t), c2(t), . . . , cp(t), x0, xf , T1, T2) be a network with positive and nonde-
creasing cost functions cie(t), i = 1, p, on the edges e ∈ E. Moreover, let us assume that in G = (X,E) there exists a
discrete path PG(x0, xf) from x0 to xf such that
T1 |E(PG(x0, xf))|T2,
i.e.PG(x0, xf)={x0, e0, x1, e1, x2, . . . , xT (xf )−1, eT (xf )−1, xT (xf )},whereT1T (xf)T2 (herePG(x0, xf)may contain
directed cycles). Then for the nonstationary dynamic c-game on the network there exist nonstationary strategies in the
sense of Nash u∗1, u∗2, . . . , u∗p.
Proof. Let us consider arbitrary stationary strategies s1, s2, . . . , sp of the players in the dynamic c-gameon the auxiliary
time-expanded network (G, Y1, Y2, . . . , Yp, c1(t), c2(t), . . . , cp(t), y0, yf). It is obvious that in the initial dynamic
c-game on ((G,X1, X2, . . . , Xp, c1(t), c2(t), . . . , cp(t), x0, xf , T1, T2)) we uniquely can put the nonstationary strate-
gies u1, u2, . . . , up of the players and vice versa, i.e.
si(x, t) = ui(x, t) for (x, t) ∈ Xi × {1, 2, . . . , T }, i = 1, p.
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So, between the set of the stationary strategies of the players on the network (G,Y1, Y2, . . . , Yp, c1(t), c2(t), . . . , cp(t),
y0, yf ) and the set of the nonstationary strategies of the players on (G,X1, X2, . . . , Xp, c1(t), c2(t), . . . , cp(t), x0, xf ,
T1, T2) there exists a bijective mapping which preserve the integral-time costs on certain trajectories: if s∗1, s∗2, . . . , s∗p
is an equilibrium solution in the sense of Nash for the stationary case of the problem on the network (G,Y1, Y2, . . . , Yp,
c1(t), c2(t), . . . , cp(t), y0, yf ) then we observethat
u∗(x, 1) = s∗(x, t) for (x, t) ∈ Xi × {1, 2, . . . , T2}, i = 1, p
is an equilibriumsolution in the senseofNash for the nonstationary case of the gameon thenetwork (G,X1, X2, . . . , Xp,
c1(t), c2(t), . . . , cp(t), x0, xf , T1, T2). Since the time t on the time-expanded network for every position is determined
by the level set the cost functions ci(x,t)(t), i = 1, p on the auxiliary network can be considered as constant. Therefore,
if in G there exists a directed path PG(y0, yf) from y0 to yf then for the dynamic c-game on the auxiliary network Nash
equilibria exist:
According to Lemma 1 such a path PG(y0, yf) exists in G because in G there exists a directed path PG(x0, xf) ={x0, e0, x1, e1, x2, . . . , xT (xf )−1, eT (xf )−1, xT (xf )}whereT1T (xf)T2 (PG(x0, xf)may contain directed cycles). 
On the basis of this theorem we can propose now the following algorithm for determining the equilibrium nonsta-
tionary strategies of the players in such dynamic c-games:
Algorithm 3.
1. We construct the auxiliary time-expanded network
(G, Y1, Y2, . . . , Yp, c
1(t), c2(t), . . . , cp(t), y0, yf).
2. Deﬁne the equilibrium stationary strategies s∗1, s∗2, . . . , s∗p in the dynamic c-game on
(G, Y1, Y2, . . . , Yp, c
1(t), c2(t), . . . , cp(t), y0, yf).
3. Put
u∗i (x, i) = s∗i (x, t) for (x, t) ∈ Xi × {1, 2, . . . , T2}, i = 1, p.
In the next section we extend our approach for multiobjective control problems on networks with Pareto optimality
principles.
6. Algorithmic determination of Pareto solutions
6.1. Stationary strategies
First of all, an algorithm for determining Pareto stationary solutions for multiobjective control problems on networks
without a restriction on the number of the stages when the costs on the edges are constant and positive functions is
proposed:
Algorithm 4. Preliminary step (step 0). Set X0 = {xf}; E0 = ∅; Hixfxf = 0, i = 1, p.
General step (step k) If Xk−1 = X then ﬁnd the set of edges
E(Xk−1) = {e = (y, x) ∈ E|x ∈ Xk−1, y ∈ X\Xk−1}.
Then ﬁx an index ir ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p} and ﬁnd in E(Xk−1) an edge e′ = (y′, x′) such that the following conditions are
satisﬁed:
(a) Hiry′xf = H
ir
x′xf + cir(y′,x′) = min
(y,x)∈E(Xk−1)
{Hirxxf + cir(y,x)};
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(b) there is no edge (y, x) ∈ E(Xk−1) with
Hixxf + ci(y,x)H
ir
x′xf + cir(y′,x′), i = 1, p and
H
i0
xxf
+ ci0(y,x) <H
ir
x′xf + cir(y′,x′) for an index i0 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p}.
After that we put Xk = Xk−1 ∪ {y′}, Ek = Ek−1 ∪ {(y′, x′)} and go to the next step. If Xk−1 = X(k = n) then ﬁnd the
tree GT n−1 = (X,En−1) which determines the optimal Pareto strategy s∗ of the players as follows:
s∗(y) = x for y ∈ X\{xf} if (y, x) ∈ En−1.
Remark 9. Algorithm 4 is an extension of Dijkstra’s algorithm [10] for a multiobjective version of the optimal paths
problem in a weighted directed graph. The algorithm determines the stationary Pareto strategy s∗ of the players for the
multiobjective control problem on the network (G,X, c1, c2, . . . , cp, x0, xf , T1, T2) with an arbitrary starting position
x ∈ X and given ﬁnal positions xf ∈ X, i.e. the tree GT n−1 = (X,En−1) gives all Pareto optimal paths from every
x ∈ X to xf .
Now we can prove that:
Theorem 3. Algorithm 4 ﬁnds Pareto stationary strategies of the players in the multiobjective control problem on the
network (G,X, c1, c2, . . . , cp, x0, xf) for every given starting position x and ﬁnal position xf . The running-time of the
algorithm is O(n3p).
Proof. We prove this theorem by using the induction principle on the number of players p. In the case p=1Algorithm
4 becomes Dijkstra’s algorithm for determining the tree of shortest paths in a weighted directed graph, therefore the
theorem holds.
Let us assume that the theorem holds for any pq, q1, and let us show that it is true for p = q + 1.
We consider an auxiliary graphG′q+1=(X,Eq+1∪(E\E(Xp+1))), whereEq+1 represents the set of edges e′=(y′, x′)
found at the iterations of Algorithm 4 with ir = q + 1 and
Xq+1 = {y′ ∈ X | e′ = (y′, x′) ∈ Eq+1},
E(Xp+1) = {e ∈ E | e = (y′, x) ∈ E}.
Based on conditions (a) and (b) of Algorithm 4 we may conclude that if we ﬁnd a Pareto solution of the multiobjective
problem on G′ with respect to players 1, 2, . . . , q, q + 1, then we obtain the same solution of the problem as on G.
Taking into account that in G every vertex y′ ∈ Xq+1 has only one leaving edge, we may regard our problem on G′ as
a multiobjective one with respect to players 1, 2, . . . , q.
According to the induction principle Algorithm 4 ﬁnds a Pareto solution for the multiobjective problem with respect
to players 1, 2, . . . , q. In such a way we obtain the Pareto solution s∗ of the problem on the auxiliary graph G′ which
at the same time is the Pareto solution of the problem on G with respect to players 1, 2, . . . , q, q + 1.
It is easy to observe that the number of the elementary operations at the general step of the algorithm is O(n2p).
Therefore the running-time of the algorithm is O(n3p). 
Remark 10. Algorithm 4 and Theorem 3 reﬂect the dynamic programming principle for the multiobjective case of the
problem with optimality in the sense of Pareto.
Remark 11 (Convolution criterion). Another approach for solving multiobjective control problem with the Pareto
optimality principle is based on reducing to the single objective control problem with a certain convolution criterion
Hx0xf (s) =
∑p
i=1iH ix0xf (s), where
∑p
i=1i = 1; i0, i = 1, p.
Note that in a such way we can ﬁnd a Pareto solution for some classes of the problem with positive nondecreasing
costs cie(t), i = 1, p on the edges of the networks. But in general case, via such an approach, not all Pareto solutions
can be determined.
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6.2. Nonstationary Pareto strategies
The problem of determining nonstationary Pareto strategies for the multiobjective control problem on the network
(G,X, c1(t), c2(t), . . . , cp(t), x0, xf , T1, T2) can be reduced to the problem on the auxiliary time-expanded network
(G, Y, c1(t), c2(t), . . . , cp(t), y0, yf). This reduction is based on the following theorem:
Theorem 4. Let (G, Y, c1(t), c2(t), . . . , cp(t), y0, yf) be the auxiliary time-expanded network for a given network
(G,X, c1(t), c2(t), . . . , cp(t), x0, xf , T1, T2). If s∗ is a stationary Pareto strategy of the players for the multiobjective
control problem on the network (G, Y, c1(t), c2(t), . . . , cp(t), y0, yf) then
u∗(x, t) = s∗(x, t) for (x, t) ∈ X × {1, 2, . . . , T2}
is a nonstationary Pareto strategy for the multiobjective control problem on the network (G,X, c1(t), c2(t), . . . , cp(t),
x0, xf , T1, T2).
This theorem can be proved in a way analogous to Theorem 1.
For ﬁnding nonstationary Pareto strategies of the players for the multiobjective control problem the following
algorithm can be used:
Algorithm 5.
1. For a given network (G,X, c1(t), c2(t), . . . , cp(t), x0, xf , T1, T2) we construct the auxiliary time-expanded net-
work (G, Y, c1(t), c2(t), . . . , cp(t), y0, yf).
2. Determine stationary Pareto strategies for themultiobjective control problem on the network (G, Y, c1(t), c2(t), ...,
cp(t), y0, yf) by using Algorithm 4.
3. Put u∗(x, t) = s∗(x, t) for (x, t) ∈ X × {1, 2, . . . , T2}.
Remark 12 (Complexity andNP-completeness). Note that our stationarymultiobjective control problemon the general
network is NP-complete even in the case p = 1, T1 = T2 = n because it becomes the Hamiltonian path problem in a
directed graphwhere all cost functions on the network are constantly equal to 1. Therefore, in a general case this problem
is NP-hard. But if G has the structure of an acyclic graph then the stationary Pareto equilibrium s∗ on the network
(G,X, c1(t), c2(t), . . . , cp(t), x0, xf , T1, T2) can be found by using Pareto stationary strategy s∗ for the problem on
the auxiliary network (G, Y, c1(t), c2(t), . . . , cp(t), y0, yf) in the following way.
Algorithm 6. Preliminary step (step 0). Set W 0 = {(x0, 0), (x1, 1), . . . , (xT (xf ), T (xf))}, X0 = {x0, x1, . . . , xT (x1)}
and put s∗(xt )= x(t), xt ∈ X0, where (x0, 0), (x1, 1), . . . , xT (xf ), T (xf) is a trajectory generated by Pareto stationary
s∗in the auxiliary time-expanded network.
General step (step k). If Xk−1 = X then STOP, otherwise we determine the set
Ws∗(X
k−1) = {(x, t) ∈ (X\Xk−1) × {1, 2, . . . , T2}|s∗(x, t) ∈ Wn−1}.
If Ws∗(Xk−1) = ∅ we determine a vertex (x′, t ′) ∈ E(Xk−1) with a minimal t ′ for a given x′ and put s∗(x′) = z if
s∗(x′, t ′)= (z, t + 1). Then we construct the set Xk =Xk−1 ∪ {x′}. If Ws∗(Xk−1)= ∅ then for every x ∈ Xk−1 we put
s∗(x) = z if s∗(x, t) = (z, t + 1) where t is the minimum on G for a given x; STOP.
Some similar multiobjective problems on dynamic networks have been studied in [4,12].
7. Summary
In this articlewe studied a special class ofmultiobjective discrete control problems ondynamic networks. Polynomial-
time algorithms for determining the optimal strategies of the players in the considered multiobjective control problems
are proposed exploiting the special structure of the underlying graphs.
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Especially time-expanded networks are characterized and described in detail. Their properties lead to constructive
procedures for the calculation of Nash and Pareto points. We presented complexity results and determined optimal
strategies.
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